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he October 16, 2002, joint resolution authorizing the use of U.S.
armed forces against Iraq (House
Joint Resolution 114) marks a turning
point in the history of American war
powers. For half a century, the executive
branch has tried to establish an independent authority to bring the United
States into war. Executives have relied
on imperial notions of the presidency,
and e;pecially on their role as com-'
mander in chief of the armed forces. To
maintain its position against presidential
usurpation, Congress has relied on the
War Powers Clause of the Constitution
and on the 1973 War Powers
Resolution. Despite this historic tension,
following a surprisingly mild political
battle during the summer of 2002, the
107th Congress preauthorized President
George W. Bush to use armed force
against Iraq, effectively ceding the power
to declare war to the president--at least
in this one case. And the National
Security Strategy introduced in
September 2002 implies that the president may well continue to pursue preemptive wars like the invasion of Iraq,
practically guaranteeing that the nation
will face similar questions in the near
future. Because the president still does
not acknowledge the constitutional limitations, and Congress has dodged the
issue, at least about Iraq, it is important
to recognize it and insist that the president must seek congressional approval
for future preemptive invasions.
War Powers
The text is simple: pursuant to Article
I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the U.S.
Constitution, "The Congress shall have
Power . . .To declare War." On this
there is no question. The Founders'
decision to use the word declare instead
of make leaves the president limited and
clearly delineated power to "repel sudden attacks" against the United States.
Under Daniel Webster's widely cited
definition, such a defensive war is justified (and presumably needs no congres-
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sional authorization) when the necessity
to act is "instant, overwhelming, and
leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation."
Responding to perceived trespasses
by Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and
Richard Nixon in initiating and expanding the war in Southeast Asia, Congress
clarified its sole authority to declare war

determine the legal status of the conflict. They posit that the president has
the "inherent executive authority" to initiate wars as commander in chief under
Article 11, Section 2 and as part of the
plenipotentiary power of the office. This
argument, if accepted, would give the
president virtually unlimited powers to
use force-not only to repel sudden

in 1973. The War Powers Resolution
(WPR) requires the president to report
to, and regularly consult with, Congress
after deploying armed forces to a combat zone. Unless Congress authorizes
military action, the WPR requires the
president to withdraw U.S. forces within
sixty days of deployment. A congressional declaration of war or enabling
resolution such as House joint
Resolution 114 supercedes these
requirements by authorizing the president to conduct war.
Some argue that the WPR is ineffective and unconstitutional because it seeks
to alter the constitutionalwar powers
framework, noting that no president has
recognized the WPR's authority. In
essence, the WPR serves merely to clarify
and make effective Congress's constitutional war powers and reflects a political
reality: in large-scale conflicts, presidents
have consistently sought congressional
authorization, for instance when
President George H.W. Bush sought
authorization for the Gulf War in 1991.

attacks but also to launch offensive
operations, for example, as part of the
war against terrorism outlined by the
National Security Strategy. According to
this view, congressional authority has
atrophied over time through acquiescence to numerous presidential wars,
for example, Kosovo.
These arguments ignore or miscast
the plain text of the Constitution granting
Congress the sole authority to authorize
war. Conversely, no text provides the
president with the discretion to do so
without congressional authorization, in
the absence of a sudden and overwhelming threat to national security.

Founders' intent
Some writers, such as Assistant
Attorney General JohnYoo, would curb
the authority expressly granted to
Congress, arguing that the Founders
reserved for the president the power to
initiate wars and gave Congress the
power merely to ratify them, i.e., to

Heinonline

--

6

30 Hum. Rts. 6 2003

War Powers Clause
Advocates of unilateral executive
authority also bring a so-called originalist understandingto the War Powers
Clause. They argue that the American
concept of executive war powers was
formed largely by the British experience,
despite the historical fact that the
colonies' revolt from Britain was partly a
reaction to the Crown's excessive executive power. In reality the president's role
as commander in chief was intended to
institutionalize civilian control over the
military; absent an immediate threat, the
president may only execute Congress's
decision to initiate war.
Those who broadly interpret the
executive's war-making ability argue that
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appropriations are a sufficient checkand the primary one intended by the
Founders-against executive war powers. Congress, they say, may simply
refuse to fund further military operations.
Under this theory, Congress may halt
military actions once troops have been
committed. In reality, such a check
could well be meaningless: the action
could be ended, damage done, and lives
lost well before the withdrawal of funding took effect. Moreover, such a plan
could prove catastrophic if Congress
withdrew funding after the president
had committed a large ground force.
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Congress should not be in a position to
decide merely how many casualties the
United States will accept rather than
whether to risk incurring losses in the
first place.
Security Council Resolutions. Some
scholars focusing on international law,
such as the eminent professor and judge
Thomas Franck, propose that the president may undertake military action without congressional authorization if the
UN Security Council had authorized the
action. Under this view, Section 8, Article
I, Clause 11 was intended to ensure that
the decision to initiate war not rest with
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one person. UN authorization avoids this
problem, perhaps even more effectively
than congressional authorization,
because the Security Council "is far less
likely to be stampeded by combat fever
than is Congress." Thomas Franck & Faiza
Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War:
"The Old Order Changeth," 85 AM. 1.
INT'L L. 63, 74 (1991). As examples, proponents of this view observe that U.S.
forces have fought two wars pursuant to
Security Council resolutions: the Korean
War and the 1990-1991 Gulf War.
UN authorization does not absolve
the president of a constitutional obligation to obtain congressional authorization. Treaty obligations such as those
under the UN Charter or the North
Atlantic Treaty (forming NATO) are
equivalent to federal statutory law and,
as such, never trump the Constitution.
See U.S. CONST.,art. VI, cl. 2;
RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS
LAW3 111, cmt.(a). The examples of the Korean and Gulf Wars are
unpersuasive. President Harry S. Truman
sent U.S. forces to Korea to repel a sudden attack-the North Korean invasion
had nearly overrun South Korea, threatening irreparable harm to U.S. security
interests. As noted above, in case of
sudden attacks on the United States or
its vital interests (including those vital
enough to be included in mutual
defense treaties), the president has
authority to wage war. Moreover,
PresidentTruman sought UN approval
only as a fig leaf for acting without
Congress; he had ordered the deployment of American forces to South Korea
before obtaining UN authorization and
later commented that he would have
ordered military intervention regardless
of the Security Council's position. More
recently, President George H.W. Bush,
despite UN authorization, sought and
received congressional approval for the
Gulf War. Absent congressional
approval, Security Council resolution
alone has never sufficed for declaration
of war.

Large-Scale Invasion I s War
The administration started to build its
case for invading Iraq shortly after
September 11,2001. During the thirteen
months between September 11 and the
signing of House Joint Resolution 114,
continued on page 22
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continued from page 2
The United States should adopt a
policy of being a friend who shares its
legendary resources and wealth with the
800 million persons in the global village
who are chronically malnourished. The
nation needs a new foreign policy that
lives up to the ideals of human rights
proclaimed in the United Nations
Charter. The United States and all of the
190 nations of the earth pledged in
Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter
that they would help one another attain
the newly recognized political and economic rights that now constitute the
public morality of the world. This cannot
be done so long as the United States
relies almost exclusively on its military
prowess for its foreign policy. Lawyers of
America have to act as moral architects
who will restrain the impetuous policies
of the government that teach that violence, armed conflict, and military
might can solve the moral, spiritual, and
human problems that overwhelm much
of humanity.
Robert F; Drinan, S.]., is a professor at
Georgetown University Law Center in
Washington, D.C.,and a former member
of the U.S. House of Representatives.

Debate over
War Powers
continuedfrom page 7
its arguments moved from the idea that
lraq was somehow behind the terrorist
attacks; to a declaration that Iraq, Iran,
and North Korea constituted an "Axis of
Evil"; to a general justification based on
Iraq's use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and its animosity to the
United States; and finally to a moral
imperative. Only after the Security
Council took up the debate did the
administration take a position that lraq
must be disarmed. Despite the shifting
rationalizations, the administration's goal
has remained the same: the United
States will use all means necessary to
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depose Saddam Hussein. And yet,
despite the obvious lack of an instant
and overwhelming threat, the administration claimed for nearly a year that it
did not need congressional authorization
for such a war. Moreover, even as the
president signed the Joint Resolution, his
press secretary maintained that the
authorization was unnecessary.
Constitutionally, the president has
the unilateral authority to commit U.S.
troops to lraq or another rogue state
under the newly promulgated preemption policy of the National Security
Strategy only if he can show that such
an action constitutes response to a sudden or imminent attack. The administration has provided no evidence that lraq
had invaded or intends to invade the
United States (i.e., as a sponsor of
September 1I), let alone that it will do
so imminently. Absent such evidence,
congressional approval is needed. This
conclusion is based upon the following
three points:
First, the scale of military action necessary to force a regime change in lraq
(or any relatively stable state) strongly
suggests the action would be a "war" as
defined by the Constitution. In the most
recent judicial opinion on the subject,
Dellums v. Bush, a federal district court
found "no hesitation in concluding that
an offensive entry into lraq by several
hundred thousand United States servicemen . . . could be described as a
'war' within the meaning of [the War
Powers Clause]." Dellums v. Bush, 725
F, Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990). Congress
would more likely acquiesce to unilateral executive decisions involving relatively small forces, but it cannot waive
its constitutional war powers.
Deployment of 200,000 or more
troops (or, even a smaller force deployment in conjunction with a massive
aerial assault), as the Pentagon has
proposed, is practically and qualitatively
different from the scale of other recent
U.S. military interventions, except for the
Vietnam and Gulf Wars (for which the
president specifically sought and
received congressional authorization).
Second, invading lraq to effect a
regime change is clearly not an example of repelling a sudden or imminent
attack. At least since 1993 when lraq
may have attempted to assassinate former President Bush, Saddam Hussein
has neither used force against or direct-
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ly threatened the United States or its
vital interests (aside from attacks on
allied aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones
above Iraq). According to National
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, any
threat that lraq poses is not of an immediate nature; if it were, the president
already would have acted. Thus, characterizing an invasion of lraq as repelling
a sudden or imminent attack under
these circumstances dangerously distorts the Founders' intent to limit the
Executive's authority.
Third, time limitations help to clarify
the boundary between executive and
legislative war powers with regard to
repelling "sudden attack." The president
has the authority and obligation to repel
sudden attacks because there is no time
to deliberate,'and an individual can act
faster than Congress. A president who
feared rejection of war plans might not
want them subjected to congressional
scrutiny, but that decision does not
belong solely to the president.

National Security Strategy
The administration has made clear
that lraq may not be its only target. On
September 20, 2002, the president
issued the National Security Strategy,
which proclaims that in order to "forestall or prevent. . . hostile acts by our
adversaries, the United States will, if
necessary act preemptively. . . . [Iln an
age where the enemies of civilization
openly and actively seek the world's
most destructive technologies, the
United States cannot remain idle where
dangers gather."
Under the doctrine of preemption,
the administration claims the right to
launch wars to prevent harm to U.S.
interests: in essence claiming the United
States may decide unilaterally to preemptively invade another country. This
policy applies not only to lraq but also
to any state that helps put weapons of
mass destruction in the hands of terrorists. Indeed, in light of recent information about North Korea's nuclear
weapons program, this could well be
the next point on the Axis of Evil to face
a preemptive war.
Conclusion
The issues kmain timely and relevant: must the president seek congressional authorization to order preemptive
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invasions of rogue states that may deliver
weapons and aid to terrorists?What is
the correct scope and allocation of war
powers for preemptive invasions?House
joint Resolution 114 did not answer or
reduce the urgency of these questions.
Both history and the Constitution itself
show that the president is not free to
change the constitutionally mandated
allocation of war powers.
Mark R. Shulman is an associate at
Debevoise & Plinlpton and a lecturer at
Columbia University School of Law.
Lawrence1. Lee is a student at New York
University School of Law. The authors
acknowledge with gratitude the advice
of Daniel Reich in writing this article.

Omarska Camp,
Bosnia
continued from page 14
functioning more efficient or effective,
or performing acts that advance the
goals of the criminal enterprise.
Persecution and Sexual Violence
Notably, the Chamber also stressed
that any who knowingly participate in a
significant way in a criminal enterprise
are responsible not only for all crimes
committed in furtherance of the enterprise but also for all crimes that were
natural or foreseeable consequences of
the enterprise, even if these other
crimes are incidental or unplanned.
Consequently, even though there was
not evidence to suggest that most of the
accused were aware of the rape crimes
committed in Omarska camp, nonetheless these crimes were clearly foreseeable, as the Trial Chamber emphasized:
"it would be unrealistic and contrary to
all rational logic to expect that none of
the women held in Omarska, placed in
circumstances renderingthem especially vulnerable, would be subjected to
rape or other forms of sexual violence."
The Trial Chamber recognized that
war creates situations where average
citizens get caught up in the violence
or hatred, and people often commit
crimes they would ordinarily never
even have dreamed of committing.

Nonetheless, the Chamber emphasized, the presence of war or mass violence cannot shield or excuse perpetrators from prosecution if they knowingly participate in or facilitate criminal activity.
The Trial Chamber heard evidence
that each accused was present during
specific instances of abuses committed
in the camp, and it also heard evidence that some of the accused occasionally attempted to assist a few of the
detainees. Ultimately however, the
court concluded that each of the
accused had participated in a significant way in the joint criminal enterprise that functioned as Omarska
camp, a camp where persecution of
non-Serbs through various forms of
physical, mental, and sexual violence
was rampant. The accused who had
not physically committed crimes had
showed up for work everyday despite
the daily murders, tortures, beatings,
and other mistreatment and performed
the tasks assigned to them efficiently,
effectively, and without complaint.
They had facilitated the commission of
the crimes and allowed them to continue with ease and without disruption.
All five accused were convicted of persecution as a crime against humanity
for the assortment of evils committed
in Omarska camp.
As to the rape crime charges against
Radic, the Trial Chamber was convinced
that he was involved in "the sexual
harassment, humiliation, and violation
of women" in Omarska camp. Several
witnesses testified to his raping, attempting or threatening to rape, or groping
them. The Trial Chamber found that the
sexual violence constituted both rape
and torture. The women suffered severe
pain and suffering constituting torture,
in part because the "fear was pervasive
and the threat was always real that they
could be subjected to sexual violence at
the whim of Radic." Despite this finding, because the indictment failed to
indicate whether the sexual violence
committed by Radic was different from
the rapes charged as part of the persecution count they were deemed subsumed by the persecution count; thus
he was not convicted of rape and torture for these crimes as crimes against
humanity. Radic was however convicted
of torture as a war crime for the sexual
violence he inflicted upon women in
Omarska camp.
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Conclusion
The Omarska cam^ case can be
used to demonstrate that even during
armed conflict, one cannot turn a blind
eye to blatant criminal activity; if you
know crimes are being committed and
you perform acts that facilitate the
commission of the crimes, you can be
held criminally responsible. It can also
be used to show that women are particularlv vulnerable when detained in
facilities guarded by armed men of an
opposing side, and that all necessary
and reasonable measures must be
taken to provide protections against
sexual violence to such women. Any
planned or foreseeable crimes, including rape crimes, committed during the
course of a joint criminal endeavor
cause liability to attach to participants
in the enterprise.
The degree of culpability, the
amount of time spent in the camp, the
position of the accused, and whether
the men convicted physically perpetrated crimes was taken into account in
sentencing. For the roles they played in
facilitating or committing the crimes,
Kvocka, Prcac, and Kos were given
five- to seven-year prison terms; Radic
received twenty years, and Zigic was
sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment. This case is currently on
appeal before the ICTY Appeals
Chamber.

Kelly D. Askin is director of the International Criminallustice Institute, has published extensively in various areas of
international law andjustice initiatives,
and served as a legal adviser-consultant
for many war crimes proceedings.
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